Experts, Summary Judgment and Legal Malpractice

It is an anachronism in New York practice that there is no specific time in which to name an expert.  While the 3d and 4th departments have rules that derive from case law [and not specifically, the CPLR], the 1st and 2d Departments are much looser.  In general, a "reasonable time" period obtains.  There are some courts which will require that the expert be named 30 days or 15 days prior to trial,  there is no unanimity of what day that might be.  Is it the first day of jury selection?  is it the first day of testimony?

On a finer level of analysis is the relationship of naming an expert pursuant to CPLR 3101 and motions for summary judgment.  In the 2d Department, especially Kings County, a body of law has arisen which holds that one must name an expert and serve a CPLR 3101 notice prior to the note of issue.  Here is an excerpt from Sierra v. D'Apuzzo, 6321/08;Decided: April 21, 2010;Judge Robert J. Miller;KINGS COUNTY;Supreme Court.

"Before the Court considers whether the landlord caused or created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of the condition, the Court must first address the threshold issue of whether the plaintiff's expert's affidavit should be considered in opposition to the defendant's motion. The defendant in reply to the plaintiff's opposition asserts that the Court should reject the plaintiff's expert's report pursuant to Construction by Singletree, Inc. v. Lowe, 55 AD3d 861 [2d Dept 2008]. The Appellate Division, in Singletree rejected a plaintiff's expert affidavit in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgement because the plaintiff's expert was not identified until after the note of issue and certificate of readiness were filed and the plaintiff offered no valid excuse for failure to give notice of the expert.

An Everyday Application of Fiduciary Breach and Deceit

Here is a short decision with deep reaching consequences.  In Kurman v Schnapp ;2010 NY Slip Op 03786 ;Decided on May 4, 2010 ;Appellate Division, First Department we see the deceitful act of an attorney, and the Appellate Division substituting its finding for that of Supreme Court.  We have commented on the natural inclination of attorneys, applying rules of attorney behavior to other attorneys, to minimize and overlook.  How, one asks, could Supreme Court have come to such a different conclusion from the Appellate Division?
 
"Plaintiff stated a cause of action under Judiciary Law § 487 by alleging that defendant deceived or attempted to deceive the court with a fictitious letter addressed to him from the former licensing director of the City's Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) that stated, inter alia, that plaintiff was under a lifetime ban on owning any licenses with the TLC (see Amalfitano v Rosenberg, 12 NY3d 8, 14 [2009]). Plaintiff further sufficiently alleged specific damages that could not have occurred in the absence of defendant's conduct (see id. at 15). The 2008 affidavit by the TLC's former licensing director offered by defendant in support of his motion fails to demonstrate conclusively that plaintiff has no cause of action (see Lawrence v Graubard Miller, 11 NY3d 588, 595 [2008]).

Famous Songwriter, the Pullman Financing and Legal Malpractice

Lamont Dozier, author of "Baby I need your Loving" [the Four Tops], "Baby Love", "Back in my Arms Again", "Come See about Me" [The Supremes] and many many others, got snagged in the Pullman financing scheme. the Pullman Bonds.  Before him, David Bowie was the recipient of the financing arrangement.

In LAMONT DOZIER, Plaintiff, - against - WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS;  09 Civ. 9865 (LMM); UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK;2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42321; April 26, 2010, Decided  we see a simple discussion of amendment of pleadings.

The motion for leave to amend is denied, first, because it contravenes the November 9, 2009 stipulation and, second, because amendment as to Willkie (against whom, alone, the new claim is asserted) would be futile as time-barred.